

## THE MANAGEMENT OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL STATES IN THE ASPECT OF CONTEMPORARY THREATS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Piotr MAŚLOCH

Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa; p.masloch@akademia.mil.pl, ORCID: 0000-0002-5785-1784

**Abstract:** The article entitled “The management of a dysfunctional states in the aspect of contemporary threats of illegal immigration” aims to determine what the so-called dysfunctional states are, indicating specific features and problems related to their management. This is all the more important because – according to the author – dysfunctional states are the beginning of contemporary problems in Europe and the world concerning, for example, terrorism or illegal immigration. The second part of the article points to the key threats to democratic states caused by illegal immigration, which results, among others, from improper management (lack of management) of dysfunctional states.

**Keywords:** dysfunctional states, globalization, illegal immigration, management.

## ZARZĄDZANIE PAŃSTWAMI DYSFUNKCYJNYMI W ASPEKCIE WSPÓŁCZESNYCH ZAGROŻEŃ ZWIĄZANYCH Z NIELEGALNĄ IMIGRACJĄ

**Streszczenie:** Artykuł zatytułowany „Zarządzanie państwami dysfunkcyjnymi w aspekcie współczesnych zagrożeń związanych z nielegalną imigracją” ma na celu określenie, czym są tak zwane państwa dysfunkcyjne, wskazując na specyficzne cechy i problemy związane z procesem zarządzania nimi. Jest to tym ważniejsze, że – według autora – państwa dysfunkcyjne są początkiem współczesnych problemów w Europie i na świecie, dotyczących na przykład terroryzmu lub nielegalnej imigracji. Druga część artykułu wskazuje na kluczowe zagrożenia dla państw demokratycznych spowodowane nielegalną imigracją, wynikające m.in. z niewłaściwego zarządzania (braku zarządzania) państwami dysfunkcyjnymi.

**Słowa kluczowe:** państwa dysfunkcyjne, globalizacja, nielegalna imigracja, zarządzanie.

## 1. Introduction

The unhindered development of states and societies from the last decade of the XX century is currently subject to certain limitations resulting from several fundamental factors, among which one should distinguish, among other things, the emergence and development of dysfunctional states. The way of managing them is an important issue concerning the functioning of dysfunctional states.

The aim of the article is to show illegal immigration as a threat to EU states in the 21st century and to indicate the causes of this phenomenon, which are dysfunctional states and the management process inside of them. In this approach, the problems described gave rise to the development of phenomena that in the form of, for example, illegal immigration developed in an uncontrolled manner in the XXI century.

With reference to the issue of the article, the following arguments have been formulated:

Argument I: The sources of contemporary threats related to illegal immigration should be seen in the mid-70s of the XX century (the creation of the so-called Western Sahara).

Argument II: In the conditions of contemporary globalization and the development of dysfunctional states, the phenomena of illegal immigration are getting worse.

Argument III: The current state of research on the development of the dysfunctional states management process entitles us to formulate the term “lack of management”.

In connection with the adopted arguments, an analysis of available literature and Internet sources was carried out in order to verify them.

## 2. Dysfunctional states and their features

The XXI century brought completely new, previously unknown threats to the world. The basic threats include both international terrorism and illegal immigration. It has been widely accepted that the so-called Islamic State is mainly responsible for the above-mentioned threats. In this article, the author will try to prove that IS isn't the only source of threats to the modern world and is not the only organization responsible for the process of mass immigration – this part of the article will present other reasons, which may not be as significant as IS, but they affect the development and shape the international scale of the phenomenon. After a detailed analysis of the literature related to the issues raised, the term *dysfunctional state* should be defined. It is worth considering here where they come from and which such countries were created at all. In order to be able to fully understand this issue, it should be related to the fall of the communist system in 1989-1991, when the simplicity of the bipolar global order at that time disappeared. This new world order and the accompanying processes of multi-level

and multidirectional globalization favoured the deepening of the interdependence of individual countries and regions. The initiatives of internationalization, institutionalization and universally accepted globalization were “accompanied by the state of some anarchization and defragmentation of countries in a state of deepening political crises” (Wilkin, 2004).

What’s more, in the “perfect” world shaped after 1989, it was naively believed that the processes of globalization, openness, free trade and free competition would shape the order of the new world (Balcerowicz, 2002). It turned out that in the world at the turn of the XX and XXI century, the basic treat was not due to the power (strength) of a specific country, but rather its weakness (dysfunction/dysfunctionality), unpredictability, and even the disappearance of state structures due to weakness/loss of authoritative functions by a specific *centre of power* – for internal reasons – mainly in the field of decision-making independence. We are dealing here with a phenomenon that has been described as *Failed States*, that is “a failed state” (Bieleń, 2006; Kuźniar, et al., 2005).

The fallen state is formed by geopolitical organisms that meet the formal requirements of international public law, but in practice they are peculiar non-states. They lack internal coherence, moreover, they do not fulfill the criterion of having a monopoly on the use of force and physical strength on their own territory. In their areas there is a state of chronic anarchy, chaos, war between everyone and the related problems, such as poverty, epidemics, migration crises, ethnic and racial cleansing, terrorism or organized crime. Their voice is also hardly heard in the international environment due to evident economic and political weakness, as well as social cohesion. As a consequence, they are mainly associated with the “fallen states”, “phantom countries” or even with “no man’s land” (Cooper, 2005; Fukuyama, et al., 2005).

We deal with a dysfunctional state, commonly known as “a fallen country”, when “[...] the government loses control of its territory or no longer has monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other symptoms of the distribution of such a state are: erosion of the system of legitimization, inability to manage public services and loss of monopoly on representing the state in the international environment” (Potocki, and Kocoń, 2006, pp. 321-335).

In this case, this phenomenon is based on a dozen or so state threat indicators, which can be reduced to three basic conditions (Ghani, and Lockhart, 2008):

1. Public sphere – demography, migration processes, institutionalized exclusion of certain social, religious, ethnic and racial groups, drainage of intellectuals and scientists by other countries.
2. Economic factors – uneven economic development and division of national wealth, permanent economic collapse, which impoverishes and causes a revolutionary situation.
3. Political condition of the institution – oligarchization and autocratization of decision-making structures, gradual deterioration of the quality of public organizations (health service, education, telecommunications, transport, sewage system), increase in the repressive nature of a given regime and widespread violation of the normative system, impunity of security services and the emergence of private paramilitary organizations,

increase in populist and nationalist tendencies and the military presence of external actors (peacekeepers, humanitarian aid).

In addition to the listed factors, the main indicators characterizing fallen states include (Kłosowicz, 2013):

1. Army (military expenses, number of soldiers per capita, professionalism of the army).
2. Police (the number of police officers and the number of murders per capita, the use of violence).
3. Judiciary (effectiveness and independence of courts, counteracting corruption, enforcement of the rule of law).
4. Public administration (efficiency of government and public administration, corruption).
5. Civil society (effectiveness of non-governmental organizations, political responsibility).

It is worth noting that in addition to the results in individual categories of indicators, the average ability of the state to cope with the difficulties that contribute to its decline is calculated.

One of the most important factors determining the functioning of failed states is the lack of international recognition. The para-state is protected by international law provisions in a limited, relatively narrow scope – the *iron rules* of the international community are not applied to such a state:

1. The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.
2. Prohibition to the use of force against an independent state.
3. Guaranteeing the continuity of the existence of the state.

In addition, the so-called *fallen states* often meet with the disapproval of the international community, which may result in the following consequences (Leszczyński, 2015):

1. Difficult participation in international, regional and bilateral organizations.
2. Limiting the possibility of participating in the benefits arising from international cooperation processes.
3. No possibility (limitation) to receive international assistance.
4. Limited inflow of foreign investments.
5. Economic sanctions.

The effect of functioning of such a state in the international community is the destabilizing role for the international order and security, as the existence of a dysfunctional state is contrary to the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

#### **4. Management (lack of management) of a dysfunctional states.**

##### **The selected threats of the present day and their characteristics**

The problem of management (or perhaps the lack of management) of a dysfunctional state is a new phenomenon, not described in the literature. An attempt to determine what should be

understood as management in relation to bankrupt states has been concluded by the World Bank, which estimates that around 1.5 billion of the world's population lives in conflict countries using violence. The World Bank introduces its definition of a bankrupt state by describing it as a sensitive state. According to experts from the World Bank, a sensitive state is one that faces the following development challenges:

1. Poor institutional capacity.
2. Very poor (or lack of) state management.
3. Political instability.

In these countries, violence is the order of the day, which is a remnant of past military conflicts or fits in the current conflicts in the territory of these countries – according to the World Bank, three out of four vulnerable countries are currently experiencing armed conflicts (Anonim, 20.01.2018).

The only institution that deals in a comprehensive way with the problems of managing dysfunctional states is the *Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP)*. This organization deals with research on political violence in the context of structural analysis of world systems. The main research issue is the search for comprehensive methods of managing social and systemic conflicts, conducted at the global, regional and national level. The main emphasis is placed on the essential dimensions of the global system: conflict, governments, human and physical development. According to the CSP, effective management will only be possible if the state is able to cope with systemic risk factors that fuel conflict dynamics and lead to the escalation of violence. The above assumption allows assuming that, in the case of dysfunctional states, the conditions of effective management will not be met, and therefore, there can be no question of effective management of such a country.

The starting point in considering the problems of modern threats is the problem of the so-called Western Sahara, which was caused by the situation in Algeria, in turn caused by the crisis in 1988 and the ongoing riots in the country for several days, with the total inactivity of the police in the initial phase of their development. The reasons for social appearances to this day are not clear, but they have been a contribution to the emergence of Islamists calling for the cessation of violence. The result of social speeches, allowing their escalation, and the subsequent bloody suppression caused such a stir that the one-party system was abolished, and already in 1989 the government of general Szadlie Ben Dzedid allowed a formation of a large number of political parties, including the Muslim Liberation Front (FIS) to be created. Soon afterwards (1990), FIS led a well-thought-out campaign based on a dogmatic belief in Muslimism that took control over each city, except Kabylia. This was tantamount to starting actions to establish an Islamic order there.

It should be emphasized that Algeria is a country still competing with Morocco. The sources of this competition should be sought primarily in the problem of **Western Sahara**. This problem appeared in 1975, after Spain withdrew from it. It should be noted that almost all Arab states refuse to recognize the new state – Libya is the exception, which acted as an ally of

the Saharans and wanted to provide them with direct help, which met with strong protests from the Algerian government. Despite many difficulties, the Algerian government continues to provide military support to the so-called Sahara Democratic Republic (Lacoste, 2010).

Thus, according to the considerations above, the Western Sahara has become an important hotspot of the region, where Algeria is mainly seeking influence. In accordance with current geopolitical trends, it is suggested that there are two Africas cut across with the Sahara region, which divides the continent into two parts called sub-regions: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (Gunther, 1958). In turn, Saul Bernard Cohen, in his concept of a geopolitical map of the world, divides North Africa into Maghreb, the countries of which were placed in one group with the European countries of the Mediterranean and North-East Africa, counting this area to the Middle East. The remaining part of the continent was defined as the zone of crises, a region of strategic importance and large resources, subject to external pressure (Cohen 2009).

In order to better understand the situation of the discussed region, it is worth presenting the countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa region with the highest degree of dysfunction (table 1).

**Table 1.**

*Countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa region in the ranking of the most dysfunctional countries in the world in 2009-2012*

2009	2010	2011	2012
1.Somalia	1.Somalia	1.Somalia	1.Somalia
2.Zimbabwe	2.Chad	2.Chad	2.Democratic Republic of Congo
3.Sudan	3.Sudan	3.Sudan	3.Sudan/South Sudan
4.Chad	4. Zimbabwe	4.Democratic Republic of Congo	4. Chad
5.Democratic Republic of Congo	5.Democratic Republic of Congo	5. Zimbabwe	5. Zimbabwe
6.Central African Republic	6.Central African Republic	6.Central African Republic	6.Central African Republic
7.Guinea	7. Guinea	7. Ivory Coast	

Note: Kłosowicz, 2014, p. 13.

It should be emphasized that the majority of countries affected by dysfunctionality are Sub-Saharan African countries – this situation seems to be unchanged.

One of the basic problems of dysfunctional states is demography. According to statistics, in 2010, Africa was inhabited by 1,033 billion people (approx. 15% of the Earth's population), while Sub-Saharan Africa was inhabited by 800 million inhabitants (11,4 % of the world's population). From the second half of the XX century, the population of the African continent began to grow rapidly, despite a number of wars and an uncontrolled epidemic of AIDS. The estimated increase in the number of citizens of the Sub-Saharan region with the highest degree of dysfunction is shown in table 2.

**Table 2.**

*The estimated population growth in Sub-Saharan African countries with the highest degree of dysfunction*

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF POPULATIONS IN 2012 (in millions)	NUMBER OF POPULATIONS IN 2050 (in millions)
Nigeria	169	290
Ethiopia	91	173
Democratic Republic of Congo	66	147
Kenia	41	85
Uganda	32	85
Niger	17	58
Ivory Coast	20	43
Guinea	11	24
Cameroon	21	36
Chad	13	28
Somalia	10	23
Burundi	10	15
Liberia	3,5	9
Central African Republic	4	7,5
Guinea Bissau	1,6	3,5

Note: Kłosowicz, 2014, p. 21.

According to cautious estimates, it is anticipated that the population of Africa will reach two billion people by 2050, which will account for around 21% of the world's population. In turn, Sub-Saharan Africa has not only the shortest life expectancy, but also the world's largest number of people infected with HIV (22,5 million people). In the most dysfunctional countries of the region, life expectancy does not exceed 48 years, while the neonatal mortality is over 10%.

Another parameter indirectly associated with demography, but significantly affecting the condition of the region is the analysis of the most important areas of human development, which includes:

1. Life expectancy.
2. Education.
3. The amount of GDP.

According to the adopted parameters, the country is divided into three groups: high, medium and low level of development. Out of 169 classified states, in the last group of the least developed countries, 34 countries are those from the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

Demographic problems also generate military conflicts. The main causes of contemporary armed conflicts in African countries include:

1. Ethnic animosities, including ethnic cleansing.
2. Demographic causes – the problem of allocating very limited resources.
3. Struggle for the land – the population of some regions of Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 500% (despite the famine and wars) with the simultaneous depletion of the already scarce resources on Earth.

The most fundamental threat to the security of the European Union states seems to be the increasingly visible relation: *illegal immigration – organized crime*. There is also no doubt that many illegal arrivals are feeding the ranks of criminal organizations.

Illegal immigration is not only the activity of organized, international criminal groups – it is primarily a threat to internal security. Contemporary, illegal immigration can be located at the interface of threats for both external and internal security of the state. Currently, one of the more popular research directions is the so-called new economic theory of migration. This trend is based on the analysis of migration mobility, whereby work ceases to be treated as one of the production factors, it is no longer static. Regardless of the models presented, it seems that the following desiderata are decisive in case of contemporary immigration:


1. Economic factor.
2. Political situation, including religious.
3. The need to improve life status.
4. The security aspect stimulated by wars, dictatorships, humanitarian crises, natural disasters.

The homogeneity of the social structure, assessed on the basis of wealth, education, class, religious, racial system, linguistic community, attitudes, values and ethnic identity of the European Union states are an extremely important factor affecting the internal security in the aspect of migration movements - international migration (Wyciechowska, 2016).

It should be emphasized that despite attempts to identify potential threats at various levels, they have a common feature – the phenomenon of illegal immigration generates specific threats to the state, primarily in the area of internal security (especially in the area of public safety and order), mainly in connection with the organized crime.

Another significant threat to the security of European Union countries is that illegal migration routes may be (and are) used to transfer weapons from regions that have been or are currently in conflict with armed conflicts (Maśloch, 2017). A record number of people trying to get through to Europe has also resulted in a five-fold increase in the number of smugglers. The analysis of the impact of the phenomenon of illegal immigration on the security of European Union countries should be extended by an attempt to present the dynamics of the described phenomenon. According to Frontex data, the number of illegal immigrants entering the EU in 2012-2015 developed as shown in figure 1.





**Figure 1.** Illegal immigration in the European Union 2012-2015. Adapted from: “Globalization and contemporary challenges to security – illegal immigration” by P. Maśloch, Copyright 2017.

When analysing contemporary illegal immigration, it should be assumed that this phenomenon, without radical action by the European Union, will gain in strength.

The illegal wave of refugees is a huge burden on the resources of some European Union member states. Greece and Italy are in a particularly difficult situation – most refugees and immigrants reach these countries first, who reach Europe. Many of these people intend to get to other countries of the Community, such as Germany and Sweden. This is also a source of problems in those Member States that are on the route of immigrants heading to their destination, such as Croatia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia.

In order to counteract the crisis situation, the European Union countries have taken a number of countermeasures, including:

1. The conclusion of an agreement with Turkey by the European Union, which serves to stop the uncontrolled inflow of immigrants from one of the main routes in the Aegean Sea.
2. Strengthening the ability of the EU countries to carry out search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea and combating criminal networks.
3. Financing projects aimed at satisfying the most urgent humanitarian needs of 50 thousand refugees and immigrants staying in Greece. The European Union also provides humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants in countries outside the EU, such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.
4. The establishment of a new European Border and Coast Guard by the Member States to increase security at the Union’s common external borders and to improve management related to their protection. Similar activities were intended by Europol, in which structures the European Centre for Combating Migrant Smuggling was established.

5. Establishment of receipt centres in Greece and Italy to support the authorities of these countries in managing migration flows. The European Union also sent experts to assist in the registration of incoming persons and in the coordination of the return of certain immigrants to their country of origin.

Will the solutions indicated above prove effective? It seems that the countries of the Community must step up their efforts to develop solutions that will be accepted by all Member States.

#### 4. Summary

The modern world faces new threats that appeared in the beginning of the XXI century. An important element in the analysis of reality is that the world did not react at the right time, allowing some countries to fall, which was indirectly followed by, for example, the creation of Islamic State and the current threat of democratic countries through the wave of immigrants and the increasingly occurring acts of terrorism.

In the light of the above argumentation, it should be stated that the arguments put forward in the introduction have been confirmed:

Argument no. I: The beginnings of the processes of modern destabilization should be sought in the 70s of the XX century, which was resolved in the first part of the study.

Argument no. II: The article presents only one aspect regarding contemporary threats, i.e. the problem of illegal immigration. The selection of this problem is not accidental because up to now both the democratic world and the European Union have not successfully coped with this phenomenon, which – according to the author – will be growing in strength.

Argument no. III: it should be emphasized that the article attempts to characterize the Genesis of dysfunctional states and to present geopolitical conditions for their development. Also the problem of managing these countries is an important issue – it seems that the proposed thesis and the promotion of the *lack of management* concept is fully justified in this case.

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